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Vital Texts and Bare Life:
The Uses and Abuses of Life in Contemporary Fiction

Life was ice-bright, and disagreeable as flint.
– Mary Butts (2001 [1928]: 67)

What does it mean to write life? In one of his reflections on the question of writing life Jacques Derrida argues that his reconceptualization of the notion of ‘text’ ‘overruns all limits assigned to it so far’, including ‘everything that was to be set up in opposition to writing’, such as life (2008: 69). Derrida insists this does not involve ‘submerging or drowning them [all limits] in an undifferentiated homogeneity, but rather making them more complex, dividing and multiplying strokes and lines’ (2008: 69). This tendency to complexity, to sustaining the tension of life and text, is somewhat in contradiction to usual attempts to mediate text and life or to counter-tendencies to resolve this binary. Literary fiction in general tries to engage a ‘properly’ mediated relation to generate a text that is ‘living’, that is in the ‘right’ relation to life. The solution of the historical avant-gardes was often to violently resolve the tension of life and text by dissolving the text into life, in the turn to the manifesto, the poster, and other forms of ‘public’ and ephemeral texts. In contrast, certain forms of modernism, notably Proust, dissolved life into the text, fusing life as what can only be found through and in the text. Countertextuality, in these cases, is a matter of the resolution of the binary of life and text to one side or the other. These resolutions are often supported by a conception of life as excessive to determination, either through escaping the text or saturating it.
	In Michel Foucault’s seminar of 1983–4 – devoted to parrhēsia, the courage to tell the truth to power – Foucault suggests a counter-form of art developed around the exposure of life:



there is an anti-Platonism of modern art which was the great scandal of Manet and which, I think, without characterizing all art possible today, has been a profound tendency which is found from Manet to Francis Bacon, from Baudelaire to Samuel Beckett or Burroughs. Anti-Platonism: art as site of the irruption of the basic, stripping existence bare. (2011: 188)



This act of truth-telling is a stripping bare of existence, but also a stripping bare of language or visual expression. What Barthes called a ‘writing degree zero’, ‘a colourless writing, freed from all bondage to a pre-ordained state of language’ (1977: 76), converges with life degree zero, or ‘bare life’, to use Agamben’s formulation (Agamben 1998). This convergence also, if we trace a line from Manet’s ‘prosaically undressed’ (Moretti 2014: 108) Olympia [1863] to William Burroughs’s Naked Lunch [1959], involves the baring of the sexualised body. Here a counter-text does not so much rest on the supposed plenitude of life overflowing the text, but a baring or voiding of life as value.
	Foucault’s line of anti-Platonism can easily be extended to the stripping of language, existence and sexuality bare found in ‘blank fiction’ (Young & Caveney 1994) and to certain contemporary experimental ‘confessional’ texts, notably the work of Chris Kraus. Chris Kraus is a novelist, art theorist, and partner of the theorist Sylvère Lotringer, who also manages the publishing house Semiotext(e), which publishes Kraus’s novels. Her work is an acute interrogation of her position as a woman in the field of theory and as the partner of a well-known theorist. She makes her ‘life’ the subject of her work in texts which deliberately lend themselves to a ‘confessional’ or ‘autobiographical’ reading while, at the same time, putting these forms under significant pressure. In particular her novel Summer of Hate [2012], on which I will focus, considers the exposure of life in relation to prison and the war on terror through its account of the relationship between Catt Dunlop, the fictionalisation of Kraus, and an ex-con Paul Garcia. Unlike theoretical and literary strategies of effacement – from Roland Barthes’s ‘death of the author’ to contemporary neo-conceptual writing, ‘algo-lit’ and what Christian Bök has called ‘drone poetics’ (2007), in which the ‘author’ is displaced or replaced by the machine or algorithm – Kraus courts the heightening of the presence of the author in the text to an extreme degree.
	This literary practice takes place, I will argue, in the context of a resurgence of literary vitalism. Such a literary vitalism stresses the powers of life over the deadening forms of literary and social convention. We can trace an explicit literary vitalism to the moment of modernism, but also vitalism has persisted as a mode of grounding literary value in the contemporary moment. While this vitalism often presents itself as a counter-discourse, a mode of creativity and invention that exceeds any delimitation by the text or by literary form, it is problematic as it finds itself consonant with the valorisation of life as resource and source of value in capitalist regimes of accumulation, and in the operations of state power that take life as their object. Marx had noted, in the ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’ [1875], that ‘The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labour’ (1999; emphasis in original). This ascription of power allows for the continual extraction of value from labour-power, which is treated as inexhaustible. In the literary field, I’ll suggest, this extraction of labour also deploys the power of life to consecrate the value of literature: a literary text must incarnate and express the value of life. While this can be cast as critical or countertextual, with the text expressing a life beyond the determinations of power, it also risks enforcing a consolatory fantasy of an expressive power of life sustained within the literary that threatens but never achieves ‘full’ expression.
	Chris Kraus’s writing, I will argue, intervenes to problematise this image of an expressive life that is then translated into the text to form a work of ‘value’. Her work is not only acutely self-conscious about her positioning in the literary marketplace,1 and with issues of finance and self-reproduction, but also, and as part of that positioning, intensely self-aware about the theoretical position of her texts. Theory is a central element of her ‘material’, and Kraus is one of those writers who, as David Winters puts it, has ‘lived’ theory (Winters 2015: 5; emphasis in original). McKenzie Wark notes that: ‘Her books are theory-books, but ones which – uniquely – describe and analyse the means of production of theory, its extraction from situations, from lived time.’ (2015: 295) So, this ‘lived theory’, this attention to theory ‘extracted’ from lived time, makes Kraus’s ‘theoretical fictions’ (Hawkins 2006: 263) attentive interventions into the contemporary theoretical field. Her work develops a theoretical articulation of life and text sensitive to the exposure of life to power and one concerned with undermining the smooth translation of life into literary and capitalist value. In this way she articulates a different form of ‘counter-text’, one which does not claim a superior power of life always traduced or reduced to the functions and forms of value, but rather traces the complex boundaries of life and text in ways that put under stress the very notion of ‘value’.


Sexual Life
The vital powers of life are often correlated with sexuality. Even the notion of ‘bare life’ (la vita nuda) has, in Agamben’s original Italian, the more sexualised form of ‘nude life’.2 Literary vitalism, therefore, is also often a sexual vitalism, and nowhere is this more evident than in the work of D. H. Lawrence. While the expression of sexuality is crucial to baring the true force of life it also has to be constantly distinguished from various ‘degraded’ expressions of life and sexuality. Foucault noted, taking Lawrence’s Plumed Serpent [1926] as his exemplar, the articulation of ‘sex’ as an ‘imaginary element’ of liberation and truth (1984: 156–7). Alain Badiou, more sympathetically, writes of Lawrence’s use of ‘[s]exuality as a vector of the dissolution of the “private” and well-policed Ego into the forces of the cosmos’, and also refers to The Plumed Serpent, which ‘captures the logic of fusion in legendary, metaphysical emblems’ (2007: 213 n.43). In The Plumed Serpent this takes the form of distinguishing a true sexual ‘fusion’ from the ‘degraded’ form of fusion in female orgasm. The heroine, Kate, when having sex with the Mexican general Cipriano, is aware of ‘the Aphrodite of the foam’, ‘the seething, frictional, ecstatic Aphrodite’, i.e., female orgasm, but Cipriano denies her this ‘satisfaction’ for the sake of a ‘hot flow’ that she must yield to (Lawrence 1950: 439–440). Lawrence’s aim to ‘realise sex’ (in Foucault 1984: 157), tries to extract the vital power of sex from any dissolution. This is what makes Lawrence an acute antagonist of Freud. While Freud seems to open the power of sexuality as key to culture, Freud’s reading of the sexual ‘drive’ (Trieb) denies it the expressive power of any vitalism.3 In contrast, Lawrence stresses the goal of coition as the only truly creative expression of sexuality (Lawrence 1961: 12).
	In literary modernism vitalism and sexuality are inextricably and complexly linked. While Lawrence marks the need to extract life and sex from the ‘deployment’ of sexuality, elsewhere the ‘mechanical’ and ‘degraded’ nature of sex is stressed. This is true of T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land [1922], the poem of barrenness and re-birth, in which ‘the human engine waits / Like a taxi throbbing waiting’ (Eliot 1974: 71). In perhaps the most depressing sex scene in canonical literature, the ‘young man carbuncular’ seduces the typist and after sex ‘She smooths her hair with automatic hand, / And puts a record on the gramophone’ (Eliot 1974: 72), pairing the sexual with the machine: taxi, typewriter, and gramophone. Charles Ferrall has noted the uncanny nature of Eliot’s work, poised between life and death, inhabiting a paradoxical ‘morbid vitality’, and so problematising vitalism (2001: 88). In Derrida’s later words, used to characterise a more general sense of writing, we have here: ‘[w]riting as sweet nourishment or as excrement, the trace as seed or mortal germ, wealth or weapon, detritus and/or penis, etc.’ (1978: 231). This unstable oscillation threatens the vitalist desire to extract ‘good’ life from ‘bad’.
	This vitalist impulse is also transmitted into literary criticism and theory. The Lawrentian strain is explicitly transferred by F. R. Leavis, with his use of the criterion of ‘life’ as decisive. Gary Day has noted the transmission of a vitalist stress on ‘force’ or ‘intensity’ that links such unlikely bedfellows as Leavis, William Empson, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida (2008: 256, n.21). This connection might seem rather tenuous, and the moment of ‘theory’ to have definitively displaced invocations of ‘life’ in literary theory and criticism. The displacement of life, however, was less final than is often supposed. Within the moment of theory the work of Deleuze, including his work of literature (Deleuze 1998), was an idiosyncratic re-inscription of vitalism. More recently, and broadly, the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000; 2006) has stressed the powers of life, incarnated in the multitude, as a source of resistance. While Negri denies charges of vitalism (Negri in Casarino and Negri 2008: 149), his work constantly stress the potential power of life as a mode that exceeds control and determination.
	The contemporary humanities has also witnessed a turn to the vital through the various new materialisms, object-oriented philosophies, and the literary studies inspired by Bruno Latour (see Noys 2015 for a critical survey). This turn to ‘matter’ and ‘objects’ has stressed how what was previously treated as ‘inert’ in fact incarnates a liveliness, resistance, and a capacity to evade forms of capture and control. If, in Negrian formulations, the power of life was coordinated with the subject, even a dispersed super-subject, now we can say this power has overflowed to the ‘object’. In literary studies an interest in the ‘new animism’, primarily found in contemporary anthropology, has also led to a return to modernist deployments of the occult and mystical as sites of animated ‘life’ (Mattar 2012). In these cases we witness a dispersal of life, from the ‘phallic’ vitalism of Lawrence, but still life retains the power to give value and to sustain resistance.
	A similar pattern occurs in the analysis of sexuality. A Lawrentian phallicism with, to use the terms of The Plumed Serpent, woman as ‘valley of blood’ and man as ‘column of blood’, is replaced with Foucault’s vision of sexuality as pluralised and fragmented amongst regimes of power/knowledge. Despite this attention to what Foucault called ‘perpetual spirals of power and pleasure’ (1984: 45; emphasis in original) we can note that, contrary to Foucault’s professed intentions, this has led to a proliferation of discourses around sexuality (see Noys 2008). The proliferation of sexuality can also be traced in its social and cultural dispersion. Helen Hester (2014) has noted the cultural dispersion of the signifier ‘pornography’ and how it now often incarnates a general signification of intensity. This dispersion of sexuality also does not always fully disengage from the ‘repressive hypothesis’ and the notion of the revelation of the ‘secret’ of sex, which Foucault had criticised (Foucault 1984: 35). Beatriz Preciado’s remarkable work Testo Junkie [2013] – which mixes together autobiographical discourse and an analysis of the ‘pharmacopornographic era’, through Preciado’s experimentation with taking synthetic testosterone – is illustrative of this tension. Recounting her coming out to her mother, Preciado writes: ‘But after having resisted her unrelenting heterosexual surveillance system, I revel in this moment of truth. With icy cruelty I tell her: I like girls.’ (2013: 92) Sexuality is still a matter of ‘truth’, of speaking the truth to power, which while consonant with Foucault’s analysis of truth as a regime, a way of speaking, also remains within an expressive vision of sexuality as lived resistance.
	Even in Foucault’s dispersion of sexuality the spirals or fragments of sexuality and resistance can still, as Deleuze suggested (Deleuze 1988), be recoded as expressions of life, of the ‘powers’ of a life that overflows control. This stress on the subversive power of sexuality has not gone unchallenged, especially in the work of Leo Bersani (2009: 3–30). Bersani questions any automatic transition between a ‘dissident’ sexual identity and radical politics (2009: 12–13), rejecting what he calls ‘the redemptive reinvention of sex’ (2009: 22; emphasis in original), which cuts across a vast range of discussions of sexuality. This leads Bersani to reject a ‘gentrifying’ of sex, especially in its expressive mode, and, in its place, to stress core fantasies of passivity, violation, and ‘self-shattering’ (2009: 24–25). Instead of redeeming sex we should confront its ‘ontological obscenity’ (Bersani 2009: 29). While salutary in noting and questioning the redemptive trajectory of much work on sexuality, which reinforces the correlation of ‘good’ sex with an expressive and ‘good’ life, Bersani’s is a minority position. The redemptive discourse Bersani identifies remains hegemonic and converges with more general speculations or turns to conceptions of animism and ‘living’ matter to constitute contemporary literary vitalism.
	So, any attempt to inhabit or claim a ‘post-literary’ situation or to ‘counter’ the usual formations of literature cannot, I contend, simply avoid or dissolve the problem of life or sexuality, or their coordination. The issue of literary vitalism is also one that is embedded within the institutional forms of contemporary literature and literary study, including the ‘forms of life’ which literary writers inhabit. Mark McGurl (2009) has noted the dominance of the creative writing program, with the injunction ‘write what you know’, in postwar fiction, especially postwar American fiction. In this situation the drive to an autobiographical reference is central to the contemporary novel, as what we know is the ‘self’ and our experience. Essential here is the correct mediation of this life into the text, as to write life requires the displacement of the expressive power of life into an expressive text that is not limited by the particular ‘life’ that is its referent. Life must overflow its initial determination. While this literary mode involves a close attention to textuality, it also depends on training in the process of transformation that reinforces the notion of an expressive life. The institutional mediators of this process are, as McGurl notes, effaced in the final production of the literary text, although they can be registered in those texts. In this case institutional and pedagogic forms support a vision of the literary which can maintain and mediate ‘correctly’ the relation of life and text, in which life is the expressive support of the text.
	What we have traced is a dialectic of expressive life and expressive text, to form a ‘vital text’ that is also a countertext, which always exceeds determination. We have also witnessed a transition from an aristocratic and elitist vitalism, which distinguishes life through constricting it, symbolised in Lawrence’s phallocentrism, to a dispersed and generic life. While this movement democratises life and pluralises it, the underpinning of excessive life is not abandoned but intensified. The difficulty is that this movement of countertextuality relies still on a notion of excessive life that sustains value, even if this value is posed against the constrictions and limits of literary value or capitalist value. What is not challenged is the model of life as resource that can be drawn-upon to extract value. Also, the problem of life is left generic and this limits the possibility of exploring the entanglement of life with the text and with the forms of abstract power.

Sexual Embarrassment
In her review of Ben Lerner’s recent novel 10:04 [2014] Elaine Blair notes the tension amongst critics about the novel’s combination of ‘writing about writing’ and ‘writing about life’ (2015: 25). In the second case Blair notes that both Lerner’s novels are constructed around the figure of the highly-educated man who has evaded and deferred personal responsibility. She points out:



As 19th-century Russians fight duels and gamble, late 20th and 21st-century Americans confess to episodes of excruciating, sexually themed embarrassment. They cryptically acknowledge their morally compromised positions near the top of an unfair social system, and at the same time register and lament a loss of status. (2015: 25)



Lerner’s fiction is exemplary of this ‘struggle’, and his first novel Leaving the Atocha Station [2011] focuses this not only through sexual embarrassment, but also through a more general sense of ‘fraudulence’: ‘who wasn’t squatting in one of the handful of prefabricated subject positions offered by capital or whatever you wanted to call it, lying every time she said “I”; who wasn’t a bit player in a looped infomercial for the damaged life?’ (Lerner 2013: 101)
	The convenience is obviously to allocate ‘fraudulence’ to ‘writing about writing’, while truth is located on the side of ‘writing about life’. Lerner’s 10.04 plays with this dynamic as the narrator’s original aim to write a novel about a writer who fakes correspondence with famous writers to sell to a US university archive is displaced by a writing about those around him. Fraudulence is located with writing, it seems. But, of course, Lerner’s fiction complicates this as the life of his narrators is intensely self-reflexive, bookish, and literary, or narcissistic, according to taste. Life ‘itself’ is literary and therefore ‘fraudulent’. Despite this, however, his novels still toy with small redemptive moments of ‘real’ connection, of ‘real’ life: a successful book launch in Leaving the Atocha Station and a successful tour of a natural history museum with a child in 10.04. Life may be scaled-down from the grandiose Lawrentian modernist vitalism, but it persists in the moments of ‘real’ connection, reminiscent of E. M. Forster’s strained humanism.
	Chris Kraus’s fiction, at first, might seem to belong to this configuration, although, and significantly, displaced through gender. Her first novel, I Love Dick [1997], recounts a ‘performance’ obsession with the British cultural theorist Dick Hebdige in an epistolary mode (Fisher 2014). In the novel, Kraus critiques the fact that ‘[t]he “serious” contemporary hetero-male novel is a thinly veiled Story of Me, as voraciously consumptive as all of patriarchy’ (2006: 72). This could be considered, in advance, a comment on certain elements of Lerner’s fiction. Kraus argues that the ‘hero’ or ‘anti-hero’ of this type of novel is transparently the author while everyone else is fictionalised and so reduced to supporting ‘characters’. Her response is not to further efface the author, but instead to write in the other ‘characters’ as they are, in this case using their real names: Chris, Dick, Sylvère. Kraus notes that ‘When women try to pierce this false conceit by naming names because our “I’s” are changing as we meet other “I’s,” we’re called bitches, libellers, pornographers and amateurs.’ (2006: 72) An emblematic example of such a reaction is that to Marie Calloway’s short story ‘Adrien Brody’, about her relationship with a married man, which was originally published under the real name of the man. Reactions to this situation, and more generally to Calloway’s mode of ‘confessional’ fiction, are themselves recorded in Calloway’s work what purpose did i serve in your life? [2013] in the form of memes (2013: 141–152). Calloway, like Kraus, integrates the critical judgements on her position into her work.
	Kraus is claiming the right to experiment through un-mediating her experience, through displacing the narcissism of a male fiction that consumes the world by a fiction that places itself into the world, and so risking these charges of being unable to write ‘fiction’. Kraus’s ‘lonely girl phenomenology’ (Kraus 2006: 135) continued through Aliens & Anorexia (2000), about the failure of the narrator ‘Chris’ to succeed in making a film based on Simone Weil’s Gravity and Grace,4 and Torpor (2006), about the relationship of Jerome, a literature professor, and Sylvie, a writer and filmmaker, which focuses on her desire for a child and his refusal of that desire. In one of her essays on art Kraus remarks: ‘Contemporary fiction takes this one step further: only upper-middle class domestic life is worth considering. My Grandmother’s Cancer, My Divorce, My Subjectivity. And they could be right.’ (Kraus 2011: 157) What starts as a seeming criticism of the confines of contemporary fiction, which finally ends in the self (‘My subjectivity’), is gently displaced by the concluding line (‘they could be right’). This, again, speaks to Kraus’s position, with her novels concern with her own subjectivity, as ‘Chris’ states in I Love Dick: ‘perhaps the only thing she had to offer was her specificity.’ (2006: 97) It is this ‘specificity’, this ‘Kraus-not-Kraus’ (Schwendener 2011), that displaces the claim to speak for all, the constitution of the everyman, that dominates contemporary fiction, particularly in its male form.
	This is also writing which is aware of money, in Kraus’s position as spousal appendage, and of the translation between the art world and theory. Kraus is wryly cynical about her own art-writing and teaching, revealing how she passes on work to her ‘assistants’, in exchange for the help she gives them. She is also wryly cynical about her audience:



Hence, her writing was read almost exclusively in the art world, where she attracted a small core of devoted fans: Asperger’s boys, girls who’d been hospitalised for mental illness, assistant professors who would not be receiving their tenure, lap dancers, cutters, and whores. (Kraus 2012: 16)



This biting of the hand that feeds is, of course, not an unfamiliar gesture and not, in itself, antagonistic to an art or publishing world that can thrive of such rejections.
	This is a fiction of ‘life’, but one that tries to resist a generic inscription of life with a capital ‘L’, of life as power or capacity, and of life as the driver for a text that is saturated with life. Instead, while courting some of these effects, Kraus’s insistence on specificity and a reflexive consideration of the tensions and transformations of the ‘I’ and the authorial ‘I’ displace a discourse that arbitrates value through life. Wark notes that Kraus’s fiction can be read as ‘a method – actually a series of methods – for conjoining this woman’s experience with the world.’ (Wark 2015: 297; emphasis in original) This is not to say that Kraus is not concerned with ‘value’, literary and financial, but this concern is not minimised by some claim to an expansive and capacious ‘life’ of which ‘value’ is merely one part. Neither does it take the path of a humanist ‘real’ connection through the ‘everyday’ forms of life, which still give animating power to life. Instead, by placing her specificity in the text and in direct proximity to the question of value, and exchange-value, Kraus conveys a sense of lived experience as one of ‘visceral abstractions’ (Ngai 2015), an experience formed within relations of value that don’t simply adhere to the simplicity or expressivity of ‘life’. This suggests a different form of countertextuality, a different way of exploring ‘life’ and text, but one which does not try to dissolve the problem into an expansive concept of life. Instead the constriction and restriction of life forms the possibility of a new form of ‘restricted’ writing.

Carceral Archipelago
In one of his aphorisms from The Writing of the Disaster Maurice Blanchot remarks: ‘If it weren’t for prisons, we would know that we are all already in prison.’ (1995: 66) This hyperbole, resonant though it is, is given a more specific form in Chris Kraus’s 2012 novel Summer of Hate, which concerns ‘Prison America’ in the time of the ‘war on terror’. Set in 2005, primarily in Albuquerque, this reflexively autobiographical work is focused on the authorial surrogate Catt Dunlop, art writer turned property developer, and her relationship with ex-con Paul Garcia. In an interview Kraus recalls:



The book mirrors experiences I wrote about as they were happening. I was involved in a relationship with someone I met in Albuquerque, who’d spent time in prison for nonviolent, addiction-related offenses. Just like Paul Garcia in the book, he’d gone back to school, and was arrested in Arizona on a ten-year-old warrant while driving out to take summer classes at UCLA. This happened in 2006, and his arrest threw me into the thick of it. (in Heti 2013)



The novel engages with the emergent forms of ‘bare life’, presciently sketched by Agamben, in the parallels between the US ‘internal’ system and its links to the global sites of the war on terror – from Abu Ghraib to Phoenix Arizona, where prisoners are marched by the Sheriff Joe Arpaio through downtown ‘wearing nothing but his trademark hot pink briefs and handcuffs’ (Kraus 2012: 206). Donna V. Jones has linked the moment of the second Bush administration, which began on 20 January 2005, to a new awareness of ‘bare life’ in the form of ‘the centrality of incarceration policies, the continuing militarisation of the US-Mexico border, the prison camps at Guantanamo, and the scandalous response to the disaster unleashed by Hurricane Katrina.’ (2010: 16) Summer of Hate is the novel of this moment.
	At the same time, in line with Kraus’s previous fiction, this is also a reflexive interrogation of the writing self, what it means to write ‘a life’, especially in the context of the gendered self and, less commonly, class. Catt is aware of her blue-collar Connecticut origin, not least because ‘[s]he doesn’t remember much of this culture, having spent most of her life trying to flee it.’ (Kraus 2012: 10) Her relationship with Paul, which turns on the difficulty of extracting him from the prison system, is also a reflection on a class experience:



Particularly in the United States, everything has conspired to make the prison experience as remote from the “general populace” as possible, to make the prisoners as completely an Other as possible. I don’t think that was always true. I think it goes together with the annihilation of working-class history in the United States. Historically, there would always be people among the general population who had family members, friends, cousins who’d done time or who’d been in prison. (in Heti 2013)



For Kraus the personal is a way to deal with the politics as it avoids abstraction, engaging with what is actually happening. She argues that the visceral reality of the prison experience, experience in person, requires rendering in fiction. Writing, for Kraus, is an unravelling of the complexities of experience, a process of transcription, whereas, for her, imagination is a process of ‘fabrication, masturbation’ (in Heti 2013). This contention would sustain an opposition of life to the abstract, which is quite conventional. I want to argue, however, that in her writing Kraus places this binary under pressure, suggesting the entanglement of life with the abstractions of value and power at the ‘visceral’ level where they operate.
	Summer of Hate begins in the more classical ‘confessional’ framing of sexuality. Catt Dunlop’s ‘death wish’ is expressed in her hooking-up with an online BDSM enthusiast Nicholas Cohen (aka ‘Dominant Realm’). As part of her masochist contract with Cohen he wants Catt to sign-over her finances to him. Perhaps unsurprisingly it turns out that the ‘inventor’ and ‘scientist’ Cohen, who claims to be developing an anti-ageing ‘compound’, is a con-man with convictions for violence and fraud. Catt comes to believe he is stalking her and plans to kill her. To flee this situation she moves to Albuquerque where she continues her real estate business she had begun in Los Angeles. For Catt: ‘Money was an abstraction. A child of the deconstructionist ’80s, Catt’s guiding belief was in chance, process, and flux.’ (Kraus 2012: 12) Similarly Kraus turned to real estate speculation to provide her income. Kraus notes about the world of real estate:



It’s tremendously interesting, and people are less petty there than in the art world, because it’s just about numbers. At one point, instead of getting a tenure-track job, I decided to make real estate investments and operate these properties as lower-income, affordable housing. Buying and fixing, and then renting and managing, was a way of engaging with a population completely outside the culture industry. Kind of like in gay culture, where hookups are a way of escaping your class. [Laughs] (in Heti 2013)



This ‘escape’ from class, in fact a way of making contact with the class she, or Catt, has fled, is key to the displacement of Summer of Hate.
	Catt Dunlop employs the ex-con Paul Garcia as a building manager and the novel alternates between their perspectives on events. Initially Paul is happy to have employment and to share the intellectual world in which Kraus operates. Soon they begin a relationship and, as the novel unfolds, Kraus aids Paul in dealing with the various legacies of his arrest – in particular his parole conditions and debts accrued through unpaid fines. Paul’s initial offence involved abusing a work credit card while he was on a crack binge, running up a theft of $937 from Halliburton, the US multinational corporation notorious for its role in the war on terror. Misadvised by his attorney Paul receives a sentence of three to five years. The difficulty of extricating oneself from a system driven not only by the desire for incarceration, but also by the profits generated through crime recurs at almost each stage of Paul’s leaving his former life.
	The crucial point in the novel is when Paul picked-up in a terrorism alert. Homeland security stops a cargo truck carrying Asian migrants and ‘[t]he terror alert jumps to red’ (Kraus 2012: 179). Later Paul will rerun ‘the day’s dissonant string of events’ (Kraus 2012: 179), trying to imagine how he could have avoided his fate. This is the landscape of the war on terror: ‘That winter the word “rendition” had just begun to be used, but they rarely talked about his.’ (Kraus 2012: 108) It is the landscape of William Gibson’s Spook Country [2007] and Don DeLillo’s Point Omega [2010] – a landscape of disappearance, paranoia, and disconnection. Held on an outstanding warrant from when he’d left the scene of a car accident, Paul is eventually released after Kraus secures the services of a reliable lawyer. Paul will return to school, but then begin a relationship with a fellow student Amber, while lying to Catt about the situation. He and Catt break-up, but after the failure of his relationship with Amber the novel ends with Paul calling Catt again. Her reply is not recorded.
	The novel obviously correlates the telling of life, or a passage of life, with the ‘bare life’ of the ex-con who can never seem to escape the status of ‘ex’. The limits of the personal form of the narrative do preclude an expansion to the wider form of the American ‘carceral archipelago’, and notably to the full issue of the racialization of crime and imprisonment, especially for African-Americans (Wacquant 2002). Jane Hu (2013) takes this absence as a key lack with, as she notes, even Paul Garcia only nominally appearing to be ‘not-white’. Hu also criticises Kraus’s equation of travel or flight with freedom, with the ability ‘to exercise mobility’ (Kraus 2006: 81), as a sign of unexamined privilege. Of course the novel is concerned with the impossibility of this ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). As in Kraus’s Torpor the ‘line of flight’ twists back to the origin, coagulates and knots itself. In the landscape of rendition ‘mobility’ takes on a more sinister and uncanny note. Life is not a mobile and expressive value always escaping its various incarcerations, but rather the experience of life is shaped by the carceral landscape, which takes determination from forms of value. The very notion of ‘life’, a ‘mobile’ life or a ‘rich’ life, is one structured through the forms of class, race, and gender, displacing the vitalist stress on a generic form of life that, somehow, always sustains value.
	No work, of course, is unproblematic. Kraus’s own mode of exposure in this fiction, of her life and ‘bare life’, even invites the critic to take aim. There is no ‘impersonality’, which is often a claim to every personality, to hide behind. Certainly, without minimising these tensions, the novel explores the deliberate invisibility of the prison experience, even for those undergoing it. When Catt researches a past incident of strike-breaking that happened in the town where Paul was imprisoned Paul cannot link this anti-Union action to the rise of mass criminalisation, including his own suffering; as Catt puts it: ‘The words are too heavy because they refer to things that no longer exist.’ (Kraus 2012: 220) The ‘words’ do not so much betray a plenitude of life, or express and sustain that plenitude, but their ‘weight’ is that of sustaining a lack of reference, a disappearance, the absence of certain forms of life.
	Kraus’s working with exposure, throughout her fiction, is at once a familiar strategy to reinforce a ‘vital text’, but also an intervention that works towards a sense of ‘bare life’ and the crisis of the literary text in its capacity to express life. Kraus’s question, as she states in an interview, is ‘how to describe a subjectivity that’s been bludgeoned to the point of nonexistence?’ (in Bianconi 2012). Contrary to her stress on the personal as a gateway beyond ‘abstraction’, I want to suggest it offers a gateway into the lived abstraction of lives formed and shaped by the domination of value and state power. Kraus’s fiction guides us into the conjunction of ‘visceral abstraction’, particularly through the process of ‘bludgeoning’, the beating down of life by value. Her intervention refuses to regard sexuality as the ameliorative moment of connection. As was true of Torpor, we are left with the division of the couple, with sex and reproduction as the point of disconnection. This disruption of the connection of life to its expressive power or reproduction disrupts the stability of the ‘vital text’ as mediator of life, instead leaving ‘bare life’ as an exposure that crosses between life and text.


Literary Biopolitics
The contemporary moment has witnessed an explicit turn towards the biopolitical in the humanities in a series of recent works (Campbell & Sitze (eds) 2013; Luisetti et al 2015; Campbell 2011). This is no doubt unsurprising as the war on terror and the unfolding crisis of capitalist value lend a heightened awareness of what Beatriz Preciado has resonantly analysed as the ‘pharmacopornographic era’ of neoliberalism: the era of the fusion of drugs, bodies, and pornography, in new social and architectural forms (Preciado 2013; 2014). In literary studies this turn has often taken the form of a certain distance, rightly I think, from some of the more rhapsodic claims made for the value of life or the multitude as ‘pure’ sites of affirmative resistance (Breu 2014; Nickels 2012). Kraus’s fiction, as I’ve suggested, both belongs to and offers further ways to displace this theoretical and literary biopolitical moment. 
	Certainly vitalism can perform critical work. The insistence on the vital powers of life can counter the mortifying effects of power especially for those treated as ‘life’ that is not fully life. Donna V. Jones (2010) has traced, sensitively and critically, the tensions of vitalist arguments in the proponents of négritude, where life as excess is turned against those racist vitalisms that regard black people as inferior forms of life. Federico Luisetti (2012) has also stressed the power of a ‘savage’ anti-transcendental ‘decolonialist thought’, which can displace the narcissism of Western ontologies and philosophies. The difficulty is, however, in articulating these forces of ‘life’ in the context of forms of power structured by capitalist value, which itself turns on the constitution of ‘powers’ of life (Noys 2015b). This crisis of life is reinforced by Claire Colebrook’s comment, in the context of a reflection on catastrophic climate change, that: 



Precisely when life, bodies, and vitality have reached their endpoint and face extinction, and this because they have been vanquished by technology and non-living systems (including the systemic and psychotic desires of man) – precisely at this point in history – theory has retreated into an ‘affirmation of life.’ (Colebrook 2012: 194)



The turn from the critical to the consolatory is a rapid one, precisely because of the emphasis in expressive powers derailing the ability to fully trace the entanglement of life with the powers of state and capitalist abstraction.
	Kraus’s fiction, especially Summer of Hate, connects the writing life to bare life, refusing the vision of life as reservoir of power. At the same time, however, she also does not leave bare life as the series of extreme figures they constitute in Agamben’s work. Kraus’s vision of ‘bludgeoned subjectivity’ is precisely about tracing the modes in which bare life is constituted and diffused in multiple and heterogeneous forms. Rather than the separation of a force of life, instead literature is a site to examine the entanglement of the vital with the abstract. This is the contention of Richard Godden and Michael Szalay (2014) in their detailed analysis of David Foster Wallace’s novel The Pale King. They suggest that Wallace’s reflexive novel, in the style of what we could call ‘late high-postmodernism’, figures the author as a ‘doubled body’: ‘a channel or conduit through which money moves’, and ‘a species of currency’ (Godden and Szalay 2014: 1280). This, for Godden and Szalay, mimics the tension of concrete and abstract, living body and its connection and exploitation as source of value. Kraus’s work, which is meta-fictional in rather a different mode, also plays to this ‘double body’: in the case of Summer of Hate Chris Kraus and Catt Dunlop. This ‘doubling’ figures the conduit and embodiment of value traced on the edge of bare life, as the banal extreme of exploitation. ‘Life’, here, unstably moves between the ‘living’ author and fictional surrogate, both driven by imperatives of value and the desire to ‘save’ bare life – their own, and that of others.
	Two consecutive questions posed in I Love Dick condense the issue: ‘What kind of life could they believe in? What kind of life could they afford?’ (Kraus 2006: 104) The life that can be believed in, which is to say validated and justified as a ‘way of life’, is inextricably linked to the life that can be afforded, in terms of exchange-value. This is true of Summer of Hate, in which the banality of the ‘relationship’ and sexual ‘connection’ can only be rendered in what can be afforded. From the initial demand of the BDSM ‘master’ that Catt hand over control of her finances, to the fact that in her relationship with Paul she constantly hands over money, after which he leaves with a fellow student for a new relationship, suggests the lived experience of abstraction as one which dictates the form of life.
	The question remains, however, of why we should turn to the novel as a site to engage with the exhaustion of literary vitalism? Why does the novel, especially the ‘confessional novel’, remain the form around which I have circulated? If we are to imagine the ‘post-literary’ this seems to incarnate a striking lack of imagination. Joshua Clover has suggested that it is not obvious that the ‘spiral’ of capitalist value-extraction takes a narrative form (2011: 36) and that poetry, or non-narrative forms, are more adequate to taking the measure of abstraction in crisis (2011: 39). Poetry offers, Clover suggests, the appropriate cognitive mode to grasp the ‘phantom space’ (Clover 2011: 48; emphasis in original) of contemporary financialised capitalism.
	To be slightly ironical, Clover offers a more conventional ‘post-literary’ or anti-narrative form as the solution to mapping capitalist abstraction. The irony is compounded, however, by Clover’s turn to Thomas Pynchon, especially his novel Against the Day [2006], as a ‘postmodern’ writer who troubles the connection of the novel with narrative (Clover 2011: 41). While Clover goes on to discuss poetry – John Ashberry and Kevin Davies – the tantalising glimpse is still of the novel able to encompass the ‘structure’ of capitalist abstraction. In fact, to turn Clover’s argument on its head, the general narrative form of the novel, often correlated with the telling of life, might be said to register this torsion to the spatial, the abstract, and to value, more, in the sense of a tension of displacement.
	Kraus’s fiction, therefore, offers one powerful site of this torsion of narrative as life and abstract value are bound together. Her linking of the accounting of life in terms of monetary value to the exposure of life in the various forms of state power suggests we cannot divide capitalist and state power, which synchronise to develop a powerful logic of abandonment as exposure. In this case ‘writing life’ does not simplify the relation of life to text, but interrogates both in terms of a positioning of value, monetary and literary. The result is not an abandonment of the problem of life, but a re-inscription that does not immediately map the vital to the powers of vitalism that automatically overflows and exceeds any determination. What emerges here is a different form of countertextual sensibility, which can engage with visceral abstraction. The re-inscription of life develops a torsion of the text that resists mapping the vital back onto the literary and to the sustaining model of literary vitalism. It also threatens to expose the fantasy of a vitality that supports the generation of literary and financial value. The separation of the vital from vitalism does not give us a life ‘itself’, but instead exposes that life is entangled with the abstract forms of state and capitalist value that work on life.
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Notes
1. Sarah Brouillette (2014) has extensively explored the issue of writer’s self-positioning in relation to the contemporary ‘creative economy’, primarily in relation to contemporary British fiction.

2. I owe this point to Alberto Toscano.

3. Jean Laplanche notes: ‘It is as though there were in Freud the more or less obscure perception of a necessity to refute every vitalistic interpretation, to shatter life in its very foundations, with its consistency, its adaptation, and, in a word, its instinctuality’ (1985: 123).

4. For discussion of Kraus’s films, which dispute Kraus’s own negative judgements, see Schwendener (2011), also, briefly, Wark (2015: 297).
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